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Abstract:  
This paper observes how the social, political and legal life of rights continues to 
evolve in response to growing natural resource scarcity and deteriorating climate 
conditions worldwide. In particular, it assesses the type of interpretive repertoires 
actors bring to bear on issues of justice between generations and human rights 
eligibility, documenting arguments put forward in defense, as well as against 
assigning a rights status to those not yet born. It notes how scientific research 
documenting the ‘forcing effects’ of escalating atmospheric pollution on long-term 
planetary wellbeing triggers a new conversation on the limits of traditional 
approaches to environmental justice and highlights the need to consider once again 
how a more long-term perspectivism on duties, rights and responsibilities can be 
institutionally applied.  
Keywords: generations, human rights, natural resource heritage, climate change, 
legal change, political presentism 
Introduction 
This paper explores how a discounting of the long-term costs of current rates of 
natural resource depletion is defended as ‘just’ by some and condemned as 
‘irresponsible’ by others. For the latter, excessive levels of consumption of fossil 
fuels, forests, minerals, as well as escalating rates of atmospheric pollution reflect a 
form of ‘privileged irresponsibility’1 in that such deeds are not performed in 
ignorance but with significant awareness of their ecological impact. For the former, 
ongoing resource exploitation remains an inalienable right of all sovereign states 
communities, one essential to the exercise of rights to self-determination and 
continuing economic and social development. Whilst divisions between these 
positions continue to deepen, where there is agreement is on the power wielded by 
living generations to save or dispose of finite resource reserves in ways that unborn 
or, even younger generations today do not exercise power. Lacking contemporaneity 
and physical presence in the case of future generations, or political influence in the 
case of youth, both are incapable of prohibiting major polluting agents from 
defaulting on obligations to ensure that essential resources such as a safe 
atmosphere ‘are fully safeguarded’2 and the ‘dignity’ all peoples respected.3 A key 
question, therefore, is whether this power ought to be subject to more stringent 
regulatory control in light of the fact that certain natural resources are needed by all 
generations, not just those exerting power in the present? 
Existing legislation encourages natural resource heritage to be transmitted to future 
generations in a form that is not unreasonably compromised by the products of our 
living (e.g., excessive carbon pollution or armed conflict, for instance). For some, 
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however, there are clear limits to these obligations. Setting aside a portion of scarce 
resources for the benefit of hypothetical peoples of the future, skeptics argue, 
makes neither practical nor moral sense, especially when the number of chronically 
undernourished people in the world is rising (one in every nine people today, 
according to figures produced by the Food and Agriculture Organization4, and more 
than 40% of the present global population are negatively affected by water 
scarcity).5 If justice requires that we alleviate the suffering of the least advantaged, 
critics argue, then the claims of the present resource needy would appear to be 
more compelling. The analysis below lays out the main arguments presented by 
exponents of each of these positions, starting with those firmly against assigning a 
rights persona to future generations before considering how deteriorating climate 
conditions together with growing scientific evidence of the long-term resource 
deficiencies is strengthening support for a human rights approach to climate change 
being explored inter-generationally. The paper draws attention to the type of 
interpretive repertoires6 competing actors bring to bear on issues of environmental 
justice and human rights eligibility, as well as the question of where the boundaries 
of the just society ought to reside.  
 
The case against ascribing present rights to future generations 
For opponents, the main objection to granting a present rights status to future 
peoples is the latter’s potential, as opposed to real existence (i.e., not yet born). 
While we may feel certain obligations towards future humanity, such as taking 
account of the more long-term effects of current environmental, economic, and 
social practices, this does not imply that future persons are presently bearers of 
rights. Amongst those advocating this viewpoint are Beckerman7 and Steiner8 both 
of whom have questioned whether a correspondence can actually be established 
between legal rights that exist now and persons who may or may not exist in the 
future (depending on circumstances). For both of these thinkers, ‘the non existence 
challenge’ proves too big an obstacle to ever make a rights argument viable.9  How, 
Steiner 10 asks, can rights to finite natural resource reserves be enforced if the 
bearer of these rights is not in a position to exercise them? Having the power to 
enforce rights to a clean atmosphere, for instance, presupposes that the rights 
holder and obligation bearer co-exist. A certain minimum degree of correlativity, 
they argue, must prevail between parties if rights are to be actualized in a manner 
that is meaningful.11 
In this instance, the ‘likely future existence’ of humans is thought not to offer 
sufficiently solid grounds for granting recognition to unborn generations’ rights to a 
safe and healthy living environment. It is senseless, they claim, to grant rights 
privileges to persons who do not and may not exist in the future, especially as those 
conditions necessary to sustain healthy living continue to deteriorate (e.g., increased 
exposure to infectious disease, extreme weather events, contamination of food and 
water sources, etc.).12 Certainly, escalating rates of global warming are expected to 
reduce prospects for life on this planet in the years ahead, especially if greater 
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efforts are not made to steer the current energy system onto a safer development 
path. Present global trends in emissions rates13, energy policy (increased investment 
in fossil fuels) and population growth do not suggest for some that commitments to 
keep average temperatures below the 2oC threshold set out in the Paris Climate 
Agreement (2015) will hold. If agreed safe limits are surpassed and global 
temperatures continue to edge closer to 4oC rise, chemical, physical and biological 
processes that modulate the functioning of the Earth will begin to break down, at 
which point the capacity of human populations to adapt, in the face of extreme 
water stress and crop failure, will invariably decline.14 Do such future dystopias then 
offer support to Steiner and Beckerman’s argument against assigning rights to future 
generations? 
If environmental conditions eventually do not support human flourishing, can we 
meaningfully claim that non-existent future peoples have being harmed by our 
failure to preserve a planet that has not been ‘irreversibly damaged by human 
activity’?15 Further, if future peoples, by virtue of their non-existence, cannot be 
harmed, how can we legitimately claim they have rights? The right and wrong of 
current resource depleting practices depends almost entirely, according to this 
perspective, on the consequences of these actions for living generations, not for 
those not yet born. Once we begin to talk about rights, we must assume a 
framework of action in which the performance of a specific set of legal obligations 
can be realized. But how can we fulfill obligations to peoples who may never exist? 
Whatever rights future generations may have in the future, they do not possess 
these same rights now.16  At most, humanity is said to bear a moral responsibility to 
take into account the interests of future generations when shaping the contours of 
the just society. Obligations here include the need to bequeath to future peoples 
basic liberties and ensure a compassionate treatment of nature17 but in no way are 
these obligations seen as offering a legitimate basis for asserting a series of non-
correlative rights and duties between specified present and unspecified future 
peoples. Neither should they be considered a constraint on current standards of 
living or the pursuit of further economic growth (e.g., the expansion of energy 
sector).  Also advocating this position, the World Bank, in a 2011 report entitled 
‘Human Rights and Climate Change’, notes how ‘explicit human rights arguments 
have yet to gain traction to any appreciable extent within climate change 
negotiations’, especially those referencing future generations.18 This, it believes, is 
explained by the absence of any direct support in international law for a rights 
approach to intergenerational justice.  
The international human rights framework, on its face, appears not to 
accommodate easily the interests of future generations. The human rights legal 
framework appears somewhat reactive in its design, geared more to redressing 
past or imminent harms than the speculative business of scientific predictions 
pertinent to climate change.19 
Indeed, the sheer ‘speculative’ nature of scientific assessments of future ecological 
conditions, it argues, should discourage any attempts to extend a human rights 
framework outwards to include future peoples. A human rights approach is even 
said to risk ‘overloading an already fragile climate change agenda’, chiefly because 
human rights are a ‘source of mistrust’ amongst developing states concerned they 
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will be used ‘as a way of either preventing their development’ or imposing 
‘conditionalities’ on their eligibility for climate change adaptation funds.20 Amongst 
more industrialized states, also, the World Bank detects a fear that a stronger official 
recognition of linkages between climate change and human rights violations will 
bolster the case for further unwanted ‘extra-territorial’ legal regulations. Causing 
particular concern is the ‘collective or self-standing right to a safe and secure 
environment’ and its use as a ‘political or legal weapon against them’.21 Certainly, 
such concerns were expressed by the US in its submission to the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2009 on the relationship between climate 
change and human rights when it denied the existence of a right to ‘a safe 
environment’ under international law and, by extension, the legitimacy of any efforts 
to promote rights arguments on this basis.22 Climate change, it added, is‘one of 
many natural and social phenomena that may affect the enjoyment of human rights 
and, therefore, cannot be singled out as‘the cause’of human rights violations, 
particularly those arising internationally.23 Restricting resource rights eligibility to 
living ‘legitimate’ claimants, particularly those with a legal contractual right to 
precious reserves of minerals, oil, gas, seeds, forests, arable lands, etc., and striking 
‘a balance’ between environmental harm and the benefits of the activities causing it 
are asserted instead as primary concerns, as is the need to protect the energy, water 
and development needs of the present.24  
According to this perspective, rights eligibility cannot be extended to future peoples 
because, amongst other things, they are not yet the bearers of specific properties. In 
other words, to ‘have rights’ is to possess properties to which one can claim a 
legitimate right. 25 What is proposed instead is a weak consideration of the interests 
of future peoples, but not their rights. In making this argument, the assumption 
would be that one can prove the absence of any added value in ascribing rights to 
future peoples at this point in time. The assumption also would be that one can 
demonstrate how current rates of depletion of fossil fuels, forests, fish stocks, arable 
lands, in gravely affecting future supplies, affect only the interests of future 
generations, but not necessarily their rights to health26, development27, a safe 
environment (constitutionally grounded), or freedom from want.28 As the science of 
climate change grows evermore precise, so too does our knowledge of its future 
impact on the ecological circumstances of generations to come. If current resource 
depletion practices then are not performed in ignorance of their long-term effects, 
future ecological disaster correlates directly with negligence on our part.29 
For legal experts and human rights campaign groups, the World Bank’s reading of 
human rights eligibility is objectionable for a number of reasons. First, it signals what 
they believe to be a deliberate misinterpretation of the essential nature of human 
rights (not just a matter of entitlement but, also, duties to others). Rights, they 
argue, cannot be equated with ownership of the world’s remaining lands, freshwater 
reserves, seeds, minerals and other essential resources in the manner implied by its 
emphasis on the needs of the present. Second, resource needs, including those 
arising from increasing rates of global poverty, are as much a matter of 
intergenerational, as intragenerational equity, given the tendency for poverty to be 
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transmitted from parent-to-child and declining rates of social mobility more 
generally.30 
UN Special  Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston 31 even 
accuses the World Bank of trying to create a ‘human rights free zone’, portraying the 
capitalist order it supports as a hazard to the basic needs of all of humanity. Equally 
critical, Human Rights Watch32 describes the World Bank’s second draft of its 
safeguard policies for nearly 12,000 high-risk projects in over 170 countries33, as a 
‘dangerous rollback in environmental [and] social protections’. Instead of providing 
‘heightened protection and vigilance’ at this crucial point in our ecological history (in 
terms of long-term sustainability), such a policy is thought to weaken commitments 
to international human rights standards and increase the ‘discretionary nature’ of 
environmental protections. The Centre for International Environmental Law further 
questions how more voluntary regulatory arrangements could be seen as a 
preferable means of protecting the welfare of vulnerable communities, present and 
future.34  
We may be uncertain at this point as to what the good life will mean for peoples of 
the future, or how precisely populations will adapt to living under harsh ecological 
conditions. However, we do know two basic facts. First, what basic resources 
populations need to survive and, second, given their finite and precious nature, our 
responsibilities to ensure such resources are protected. Since future generations are 
helpless to change what is forced upon them (e.g., a compromised eco-system), it is 
incumbent on living peoples to impose lesser risks than are currently being created 
through drilling, ocean trawling, fracking, and similarly destructive practices. Since 
these practices directly impact upon the health of the planet, they inevitably will also 
impact upon the health of future generations and restrict the range of choices 
available to them (e.g., choices as to where to live (habitable lands), what crops will 
grow, the distribution of freshwater supplies, illnesses and diseases caused by 
cumulative atmospheric pollution, etc.). It is essential we do not act as if the effects 
of today’s extreme levels of resource extraction do not matter.  
The fact that future peoples cannot impose constraints on current rates of resource 
depletion does not take from obligations to respect their rights to resources.35 
Article 4 of the UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present 
Generations Towards Future Generations refers to obligations ‘to bequeath to future 
generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human 
activity’.36 Article 5 stresses the need to preserve ‘for future generations resources 
necessary for sustaining human life and development’. Because persons belonging to 
future generations are recognized as having of this moment certain rights by the 
UNESCO Declaration of the Human Rights of Future Generations and the Rio 
Declaration (Principle 3)37, both offer clarification as to why the welfare and rights of 
future peoples must be protected. Article 2 of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity38 highlights the importance of exploiting biological diversity in a 
‘sustainable’ manner and at a rate that does not lend itself to long-term decline. The 
potential of ecosystems, it adds, must be maintained ‘to meet the needs and 
aspirations of present and future generations’.  
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Of relevance here are both the individual rights of ‘identifiable’ living peoples to a 
sustainable future, as well as the collective rights of future generations whose 
identity may not be clearly determinable at this point in time but whose need for 
basic, life sustaining resources is. Freeman39 in his reading of Raz’s40 interest-based 
concept of rights, suggests that A (e.g., future generations) has a right to x (natural 
resources as public goods) only if the interest A has in having x is a sufficient reason 
for imposing a duty on B (e.g., living generations) to protect A’s right to x. Given that 
the resources in question are basic to survival (e.g., clean water, air, and lands), A’s 
interest in x in this instance is incontestable. Because the preservation of safe and 
healthy living conditions is essential, sufficient reason is present to impose strict 
duties on living generations to ensure ecological conditions continue to support 
planetary life into the future. The interests of no single member of future 
generations to such resources are sufficient to justify holding present resource users 
accountable for duties of care and legal responsibility (as Beckerman and Steiner 
propose). However, the fundamental interests of all together are. The essence of 
this approach is the normative protection of all generations’ ecological inheritance, 
basic wellbeing, and ongoing capacity to be self-determining (to enable sufficient 
economic, social and cultural development).41 
 
 
International legal agencies, together with a growing number of human rights 
organizations and climate justice campaigners, draw increasingly on the ‘evidentiary’ 
knowledge of science42, as much as legal arguments to support a position of 
opposition to attempts to restrict justice considerations (including human rights 
protections) to the needs of the present.  
 
 
The contribution of science to the debate on intergenerational 
justice 
Of particular value to these actors is emerging scientific research, using climate 
models of increasing complexity, which documents how and why global 
temperatures and atmospheric pollution are rising faster than previously assumed.43 
So detailed are these findings that they prompt a fundamental reconsideration of 
the way human-environmental interactions have traditionally been conceptualized. 
Industrial-scale energy flows from fossil fuel carbon, in particular, are transforming 
the Earth’s atmosphere, oceans, biosphere and nutrient cycles44 at such a pace that 
we no longer operate within the boundaries of what scientists call a ‘safe operating 
space’ for humanity.45 Increasing knowledge of ‘the deep time scales’ of human 
interference with the natural cycles of the planetary system46 now triggers a 
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fundamental reconsideration of the long-term justice dimensions of such practices. 47 
For instance, with greater understanding of how environmental harms unfold across 
multiple time frames (and implicate many generations of victims), the realization is 
that those who contribute to escalating rates of GHG pollution and those who endure 
its worst effects do not necessarily co-exist within the same time period. Carbon 
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere, for instance, cause global warming and 
global mean sea levels (GMSL) to rise for centuries.48 Every so-called present point in 
environmentally destructive practices is one with the potential to reach far beyond 
the here and now. Similarly, scientists are able to show how the pollution practices 
of previous generations have had a long-lived ‘forcing effect’ on present climate 
conditions.49 Polluters actively shape the ecological circumstances of the future (the 
effects of atmospheric pollution on ocean acidification, drought conditions, or land 
fertility, for instance, more often than not, unfold gradually). The realization, 
therefore, is that presence is not a prerequisite for the imposition of environmental 
harm since such harm can be shown to unfold across a wider time scale than just the 
here and now.   
The ‘deep time’ of ongoing eco-destruction thus necessitates a newer understanding 
of ecological agency, one that critically re-evaluates relevant contexts for the 
application of principles of justice and understands, on the basis of latest scientific 
evidence, how our existence is intricately intertwined with multiple others located 
across space and time. Chakrabarty50 notes how in the immediate aftermath of the 
publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on 
Climate Change51, attention began to shift more substantially to the justice 
implications of human-made planet vulnerabilities and risks. In particular, the 
ramifications of a growing lack of symmetry between documented sources of climate 
harm (geographically and temporally dispersed) and their victims (present and 
future planetary life). Newer scientific evidence did not offer unequivocal support for 
the historical co-existence of climate harm doers and their primary victims. Instead, it 
provided a graphic illustration of how pollution practices outrun their original point of 
initiation and counter-act what many regard as their original intention (i.e., to advance 
human progress). Each act of ecological destruction, in fact, could be shown to be part 
of a larger material circuitry of agency that completes itself only gradually in terms of 
its effects on the wider planetary system. How then could we continue to claim that 
those legitimately entitled to claim rights to limited resource reserves could only be 
those who exist in the present? The type of arguments put forward by Beckerman 
and Steiner on the necessary co-presence of obligation bearers and valid rights 
recipients no longer seemed entirely convincing in light of newly emerging empirical 
truths. As a matter of necessity, models of justice became the subject of greater 
societal scrutiny. It was only a matter of time before popular understandings of 
human rights eligibility would be re-examined52 and notions of human rights agency 
redefined.53 
In the years since, a matter of growing political and legal relevance is where the 
boundaries of the just society reside and, relatedly, who ought to be considered its 
most relevant subjects? Tendencies to accord privilege to the resource rights of 
presently living generations are subject to dispute, as are the underlining premises of 
a narrowly defined liability approach to environmental justice (where emphasis is 
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placed on the co-presence of obligation bearers and rights holders). In particular, the 
non-reflexive assumptions of presentism embedded in both prove increasingly 
unsatisfactory.54  Today we find ourselves confronted with a series of problems for 
which a broader perspective is urgently required. No obvious solution presents itself 
for the problem of climate-induced migration (e.g., no legal protections for its 
victims), no formal settlement arrangements have been established for communities 
threatened by rising sea levels or desertification, no comprehensive legal 
arrangements have been forged to address likely future conflict linked to water 
shortages or the sharing of trans-boundary rivers sources, to name but a few, chiefly 
because the source of ‘wrongdoing’ in each case is not straightforward.  
Dispersed acts of climate harm, in terms of their effects on vulnerable peoples and 
multi-sourced origins, do not reach an end point that is readily identifiable (an 
implicit assumption of a narrowly defined liability approach to justice). There is a 
worrying lack of evidence of efforts to grasp these facts or engage in forward 
planning of a type that targets the deeper, more structurally embedded nature of 
ecological destruction. Without a more long-range perspectivism on duties, rights 
and responsibilities, critics argue, climate problems are likely to regress even further.  
 
Grounding the rights of future generations in contemporary legal reasoning  
Philosophical objections and political resistance aside, rights obligations to non-
identifiable future peoples are being asserted in legal discourse on the ground. 
Furthermore, the ‘evidentiary basis’ of such rights claims is supported with scientific 
evaluations of significant long-term ecological destruction. In the final court 
judgment of the case of the Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
(2015), for example, the Hague District Court upheld the Dutch environmental 
group, the Urgenda Foundation’s right to defend ‘the environment without an 
identifiable group of persons needing protection’ in recognition of the sound legal 
and scientific knowledge base upon which it made its claims of wrongdoing (point 
4.6 of proceedings).55 Similarly, in the case of Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)), the Philippines Supreme 
Court upheld the plaintiffs’ right to defend the rights of present and future 
generations to a ‘balanced and healthy ecology’ and acknowledged the relevance of 
the scientific evidence it provided of long-term damage caused by deforestation.56  
In the case of Zoe and Stella Foster V. Washington State Department of Ecology57, a 
similar approach was taken to support the argument that the fate of contemporary 
youth overlaps with that of future generations and for such reasons, a consideration 
of the interests and rights of both to a clean atmosphere and other collective natural 
resources goods is compatible with current, legally enforceable rules. Youth 
campaigners drew on state constitutionally grounded principles of liberty and rights 
to an environment that is conducive to health and longevity58, as well as 
internationally grounded rights to development and participation59, noting how 
scientific findings provide evidence of their violation. Responsibility for the 
fulfillment of a minimum resource justice across time was defined in all cases in 
terms of what is owed to present and future generations whose interests, in 
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hereditary and ecological terms, are connected. This is an approach to resource 
justice that neither prioritizes nor sidelines the present for the sake of the future 
but, rather, attempts to address pluri-centric sources of threat to ecological heritage 
as a project of justice that must extend firmly beyond the present. From this 
perspective, intergenerational justice cannot be secured through a philosophy of 
‘each generation to their own’, especially when responsibility for climate harms 
extends across time and is supported by institutional practices that collectively give 
rise to long-term environmental problems.  
Launched in 2011, the global Atmospheric Trust Litigation campaign seeks to defend 
all peoples’ claims to atmospheric resources as transnational public assets in urgent 
need of protection. Campaigners draw on current scientific research and the 
doctrine of public trust to advance what they refer to a peoples-centred approach to 
atmospheric justice. The aim is to force state agencies, via legal challenges, to 
respond more appropriately to evidence of rising GHG pollution. States are accused 
of promoting further fossil fuel development and/or failing to control rates of 
atmospheric pollution or resource depletions and in that, violating ‘the fundamental 
rights of all citizens to be free from government actions that harm life and liberty’. 60  
Campaigners draw on the doctrine of public trust to remind states of their 
obligations to administer, protect, manage and conserve resources held in common 
(e.g., wildlife, marine resources, forests, fresh water reserves, and in more recent 
legal applications, the atmospheric commons) for the benefit of all (i.e., present and 
future generations). The doctrine of public trust has become an important legal 
resource for campaigners because it mandates affirmative state action to ensure a 
protection of precious natural resources and in doing so, empowers citizens to 
question poor management of those resources of immense value to all peoples. To 
date, Our Children’s Trust has partnered with youth and legal expert teams in the 
US, the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, the Ukraine, Pakistan, Uganda, and 
India to advance this campaign.  
One more recent legal case is that brought before the Superior Tribunal of Bogota in 
Colombia in January 2018 by twenty-five plaintiffs, aged seven to twenty-six, and 
human rights group Dejusticia (the first Latin American lawsuit defending the rights 
of future generations). The main grievance is the ongoing deforestation of the 
Colombian Amazon (the most bio-diverse region in the world) and the risks this 
poses to peoples’ rights to a safe, healthy and sustainable living environment.61 The 
government is accused of failing to uphold these rights commitments and not taking 
necessary steps to reduce rates of deforestation, as agreed under the Paris 
Agreement in 2015. Responsibility for the initiation of corrective action is therefore 
said to rest firmly with the state, constitutionally obliged to protect the interests of all 
members (present and future) and ensure policy compliance with international 
agreements. Dejusticia (2018) describes recent successful challenges in the US and 
the Netherlands as inspiring this newer legal campaign and encouraging a spirit of 
solidarity amongst youth everywhere in their efforts to protect their ‘collective 
reality’ (i.e., an endangered future).   
Overall, the type of interpretive work generated through this bridging of political 
realities, legal norms (the doctrine of public trust, the ‘no harm rule’ in international 
law and human rights) and scientific evidence on the state of environmental 
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conditions ensures that prevailing institutional readings of justice standards never 
fully exhaust the full range of interpretive possibilities, as a component of these 
standards always remain open to new movements for change. Law, for instance, is 
tested against the burden of proof of deepening ecological destruction, the rightness 
claims of competing actors, the value orientations of contemporary publics, as well 
as technical-pragmatic claims as to how best to attain common goals (e.g., planetary 
wellbeing) in ways that compel a revision of the common laws governing rational 
beings.62 Human rights to health, freedom, and life are endogenized inside specific 
regional, local, or national settings and, subsequently, externalized as new 
perspectives on such rights are dialogically produced and spread across other 
contexts internationally. As this type of communicative work emerges around issues 
of intergenerational justice, the question that arises more frequently today is whether a 
rights status should be accorded to future generations? The growing willingness of 
courts to upgrade the interests of future generations in shared natural resources to the 
status of a right signals something about changes occurring more generally in societal 
standards of justice. It also suggests a greater clarity is beginning to emerge on the 
practical and long-term goal of human rights obligations, that is, to give long-term 
direction to a legally recognized responsibility to protect and sustain human 
communities into the future, especially under conditions of growing ecological 
adversity.  
Harmful acts of resource destruction may occur at a distance and during a time 
period when the primary victim is not yet born, but this does not take from duties to 
ensure that ‘due regard’ is shown towards ‘the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ of such peoples (Article 2 of the UN Declaration on the Responsibilities of 
Present Generations Towards Future Generations)63, including a right to legal 
representation. 64 We may be uncertain at this point as to what the good life will 
mean for peoples of the future, or how precisely populations will adapt to living 
under harsh ecological conditions. However, we do know two basic facts. First, what 
basic resources populations need to survive and, second, given their finite and 
precious nature, our responsibilities to ensure such resources are protected. Since 
future generations are helpless to change what is forced upon them (e.g., a 
compromised eco-system), it is incumbent on living peoples to impose lesser risks 
than are currently being created through drilling, ocean trawling, fracking, and 
similarly destructive practices. Since these practices directly impact upon the health 
of the planet, they inevitably will also impact upon the health of future generations 
and restrict the range of choices available to them (e.g., choices as to where to live 
(habitable lands), what crops will grow, the distribution of freshwater supplies, 
illnesses and diseases caused by cumulative atmospheric pollution, etc.). It is 
essential we do not act as if the effects of today’s extreme levels of resource 
extraction do not matter.  
The fact that future peoples cannot impose constraints on current rates of resource 
depletion does not take from obligations to respect their rights to resources.65 
Article 4 of the UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present 
Generations Towards Future Generations refers to obligations ‘to bequeath to future 
generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human 
activity’.66 Article 5 stresses the need to preserve ‘for future generations resources 
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necessary for sustaining human life and development’. Because persons belonging to 
future generations are recognized as having of this moment certain rights by the 
UNESCO Declaration of the Human Rights of Future Generations and the Rio 
Declaration (Principle 3)67, both offer clarification as to why the welfare and rights of 
future peoples must be protected. Article 2 of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity68 highlights the importance of exploiting biological diversity in a 
‘sustainable’ manner and at a rate that does not lend itself to long-term decline. The 
potential of ecosystems, it adds, must be maintained ‘to meet the needs and 
aspirations of present and future generations’.  
Of relevance here are both the individual rights of ‘identifiable’ living peoples to a 
sustainable future, as well as the collective rights of future generations whose 
identity may not be clearly determinable at this point in time but whose need for 
basic, life sustaining resources is. Freeman69 in his reading of Raz’s70 interest-based 
concept of rights, suggests that A (e.g., future generations) has a right to x (natural 
resources as public goods) only if the interest A has in having x is a sufficient reason 
for imposing a duty on B (e.g., living generations) to protect A’s right to x. Given that 
the resources in question are basic to survival (e.g., clean water, air, and lands), A’s 
interest in x in this instance is incontestable. Because the preservation of safe and 
healthy living conditions is essential, sufficient reason is present to impose strict 
duties on living generations to ensure ecological conditions continue to support 
planetary life into the future. The interests of no single member of future 
generations to such resources are sufficient to justify holding present resource users 
accountable for duties of care and legal responsibility (as Beckerman and Steiner 
propose). However, the fundamental interests of all together are. The essence of 
this approach is the normative protection of all generations’ ecological inheritance, 
basic wellbeing, and ongoing capacity to be self-determining (to enable sufficient 
economic, social and cultural development).71 
What more recent legal discourse on intergenerational justice makes clear is that 
human rights law cannot be interpreted in a manner that is time specific. The ‘equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’72 transcend the temporal 
frame of the present and include all generations of humanity. Under such law, we 
are bound by rights duties even if the corresponding rights holder is absent at this 
point in history.73 The understanding, therefore, is that future peoples have present 
rights and further, that such rights have a foundation in existing law. Just as 
geographical location is thought to have no moral relevance (in principle) to the 
application of universal human rights, equally, location in time is said not to provide 
sufficiently rational grounds for dismissing claims that future peoples possess rights 
(particularly relevant in light of the discovery of the ‘deep time’ of anthropogenic 
ecological destruction and the ‘deep justice’ implications of the same). Without 
temporal or geographical specification, universal rights to liberty, health or 
development are defended behind a ‘veil of ignorance’74, that is, without knowledge 
of the specific circumstances or characteristics of relevant parties to these rights 
(e.g., race gender, age, nationality or social position). Equally, a lack of knowledge of 
the specific identity of future peoples no longer provides sufficiently rational 
grounds for dismissing efforts to extend principles of democratic justice to 
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unspecified future others.75 The fact that future victims of cumulative anthropogenic 
climate destruction and present-day wrongdoers do not always overlap in time is of 
limited relevance in this instance. Of greater importance is the fact that ‘we can 
affect for better or worse, right now’76 the ecological circumstances and wellbeing of 
future generations. The fact that this power is not being used constructively to 
lessen the imposition of ecological burdens on future peoples is deeply problematic, 
chiefly because it violates duties to transfer to new generations at least as much 
(and safe) resource wealth as inherited from previous ones77, as well as legal 
obligations to do the same. The type of common property reasoning that guides 
such a definition of duties, rights and interests, of course, runs contrary to the 
acquisitional logic of a capitalism ‘without limits’78, with its emphasis on private 
ownership rights (contractually grounded) and market imperatives. This is perhaps 
the main reason why the corporate world so vehemently opposes the institutional 
relevance of a public trust doctrine, with its emphasis on forests, rivers, minerals and 
other resources as a common heritage and, more generally, intergenerational 
interpretations of rights.  
In spite of opposition, the possibility of grounding human rights inter-generationally 
and formulating justice in deeper temporal terms is something that could be said to 
be already articulated in law (albeit largely implicitly at present). References to 
future generations and a responsible use of natural resources are evident across a 
range of legal instruments, some of which are mentioned above, but, also, a 
significant number of state constitutions. In the case of the latter, references tend to 
be either general provisions for the protection of future peoples, or more specific 
references to the natural environment, prone as it is to intergenerational 
misconduct. While some constitutional provisions focus on the rights of each citizen 
to environmental protection79, others specify the right of ‘every person’ to an 
environment that is conducive to health and emphasize that ‘this right will be 
safeguarded for future generations as well’.80 Others still focus on the 
responsibilities of the state to act as a guardian of the resource commons. Article 
20a of the German constitution, for example, defines the role of the state as 
protecting ‘the natural living conditions’ of all, including ‘future generations’.81 
Similarly, the constitutions of the Netherlands and Switzerland include a government 
mandate to fulfill responsibilities towards future peoples. 
Collectively, such legislation is an important acknowledgement of states’ 
commitments to preserving opportunities for peoples to survive an exhaustion of 
the Earth’s finite natural resource reserves.82 Second, it validates a legal prohibition 
of practices that knowingly disadvantage or harm the interests of present and future 
peoples. Third, it acknowledges the ‘equal concern and respect we owe to all 
humans, regardless of where and when they may have been born’.83 Future justice 
campaigners84 point to the necessity of acknowledging the strongly practical 
relevance of such legislation and the importance of countering moves on the part of 
the corporate world, especially, to minimize obligations to future generations, as 
well as efforts to make human rights eligibility dependent on property rights. As a 
corrective, these actors stress the dual role of all generations as beneficiaries of the 
conservation efforts of previous ones and as trustees of common ecological heritage 
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for generations to come.85 As WildEarth Guardians86, a US-based eco-justice 
campaign group, assert: ‘We don’t inherit the Earth from our parents; we borrow it 
from our children’. Arguably, the legal grounds on which a deeper, inter-
generationally relevant justice framework could be built are already present, if the 
will to actualize them is present.  Certainly, the momentum to do so is growing. 
Prospects for a deep justice framework: Substituting ‘political presentism’ for a 
‘democratic futurism’ 
Putting a deep justice framework into practice, however, requires that certain 
practical issues be addressed first. At present, it is not entirely clear how living 
generations can ensure that future ones will have sufficient opportunities, resources, 
and a quality of life at least as good as that enjoyed by their predecessors given that 
pollution effects unfold gradually. Also, a responsible regulation of intergenerational 
conduct raises serious questions about what development practices can be defined 
as ‘acceptable’ and in line with international human rights regulations? For many, 
the best way to determine ‘acceptable development practices’ is to first decipher 
what is unacceptable. For actors such as Greenpeace87, World Future Council88 and 
Friends of the Earth Europe89, Arctic drilling, razing the rainforests, or the bottom 
trawling of oceans, as practices that cause ‘serious widespread and long term harm 
to the health, safety, or survival of future generations’ are unacceptable. The World 
Future Council goes so far as to describe these practices as equivalent to ‘crimes 
against future generations’. The definitional boundaries of legal interpretations of 
‘crimes against humanity’ are deliberately extended here to include future peoples, 
as is the traditional, narrow interpretation of liability (i.e., that we are liable only for 
harms imposed on peoples in the legal present). Significant damage to the world’s 
ecosystems, leading to interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its resources, is 
said to be a concern of all of humanity and the gravity of this destruction is such that 
when it occurs, all generations are injured, both present and future.  Particular 
emphasis is placed on the protection of the atmosphere, the oceans, seas beyond 
territorial waters, and the Arctic, all of which are recognized as Res nullius in law, 
that is, as resources that belong to no one and, therefore, should not be sites for 
commercial exploitation and state rivalry, yet are threatened by both. From this 
ecological perspective, ‘crimes against humanity’ arise when there is a connection 
between repeated acts of destruction and a significant deterioration in the quality of 
common resources over time (i.e., present and future).  
If future generations were to be officially recognized as a relevant legal subject in 
legislation governing crimes against humanity, in what configuration would 
intergenerational rights be evoked to advance a deeper framework of ecological 
justice? Second, how would a judgment be made regarding ‘unacceptable’ levels of 
ecological harm (i.e., constituting specifically ‘crimes’ against present and future 
humanity) when sources of harm are often dispersed across multiple action 
sequences and generations? Third, how would excessive violations of the rights of 
future generations be addressed? In raising these issues, I wish to highlight the 
importance of addressing the procedural, as much as the interpretive dimensions of 
intergenerational justice. The fact that future generations are referenced across a 
range of existing legal instruments (including state constitutions, international 
declarations and conventions) is not, arguably, in itself sufficient to ensure necessary 
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changes will occur in procedures of justice, or result in better decision-making 
outcomes (e.g., the implementation of a series corrective measures, the banning of 
certain pollutants, or the immediate revision of non renewable energy targets 
downwards in recognition of the detrimental effects of burning further fossil fuels on 
global warming). An underlining bias towards the present as the most relevant 
context of justice remains in tact. For a deeper justice framework to become more 
institutionally viable, ‘political presentism’90 must be challenged and a type of 
‘democratic futurism’ explored instead. The latter would embrace a more 
anticipatory approach to climate justice where manageable thresholds of CO2 
emissions are planned for and enforced with the future firmly in mind, and a critical 
loss of specific possibilities for justice, freedom, human flourishing, and self-
determination consciously avoided.91 
The realization is that intergenerational justice must be a matter of assignable, 
claimable, institutionalisable and enforceable rights that hold ground across time. It 
is the responsibility of all states to ensure ‘the identification, protection, 
conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural 
and natural heritage’ of this world92. Furthermore, the expectation is that states will 
protect the resource interests of present and future generations in a manner that 
facilitates the capacities of both to be self-determining, and will do so in a way that 
respects the rights of all state communities to do the same. The Responsibility to 
Protect (A/RES/63/308), endorsed by the UN General Assembly in July 2009, clarifies, 
amongst other things, each sovereign state’s responsibility to protect the peoples 
within its borders from gross violations of human rights. The question being explored 
at present is whether state endorsed pollution practices represent violations of the 
responsibility to protect and uphold human rights law?  
In principle, when states fail to fulfill such obligations, legal action can be taken 
against them. While there are no historical precedents to date of cases where the 
international community has intervened when a state has allowed the natural 
resource base of its peoples to deplete to grave levels and in that, has violated their 
rights, there is, nonetheless, a growing number of cases where concerned citizens 
have taken it upon themselves to hold states legally accountable for neglecting their 
natural resource interests and human rights (e.g., their rights to health, liberty and 
development), and failing to safeguard these rights for future generations as well93. 
In that, law offers publics a mechanism with which to realize constitutional rights to 
challenge government actions deemed harmful to their welfare and achieve greater 
testimonial justice on matters of profound importance to their future. Importantly, 
legal challenges are a reminder to states of constitutional requirements to remain 
open to newer demands of justice, including those emerging amongst growing 
numbers of aggrieved youth. More generally, legal challenges give us some sense of 
how ‘the social’ and ‘legal life of rights’94 continues to evolve, as publics (especially 
legally engaged ones) try to make sense of the justice dimensions of deteriorating 
climate conditions worldwide. In the process, new democratic iterations of ideals of 
freedom, democracy and right are generated and stimulate the justice imperatives of 






In light of the growing relevance of a strongly practical and scientifically grounded 
critique of traditional institutional approaches to environmental justice (e.g., 
prioritizing the needs and rights of the present), notions of rights eligibility and 
human rights agency are evolving. Those most active in pushing for reform are 
international human rights agencies, in collaboration with youth and future justice 
campaigners. Together, these actors have embarked on a series of legal challenges 
of state inaction on pollution control and human rights protection (e.g., rights to 
health, development and life as relevant to present and future generations). The 
type of interpretive work generated through such legal efforts as well as wider 
justice campaigns reaffirms the relevance of human rights to an expanding range 
climate change issues. This, combined with the increasing tendency for sympathetic 
court judges to support the constitutional validity of publics’ ‘climate rights claims’ 
suggests that the type of evaluative frameworks brought to bear on such issues are 
changing.96 Cumulatively, these changes hint at new conditions of possibility for a 
deeper justice framework to emerge, at least in the legal sphere. The settled 
convictions of traditional state perspectives on pollution practices become an ever 
more regular object of criticism (e.g., a narrowly defined liability approach to 
environmental issues), as do established orders of justification that prioritize the 
interests and rights of some over those of others. New interpretations of 
reasonableness are beginning to emerge in contexts where legal disputes on matters of 
environmental justice are resolved. This, together with more recent moves, including 
the decision of the International Criminal Court (September 2017) to include for the 
first time concerns about the environment in its range of criminal investigations, 
would suggest that a degree of institutional learning is under way.    
It is publics, however, who generate such new critical insights, at least initially, and 
insist that the democratic structures of Anthropocene societies address climate 
harms in a manner that is fair to all concerned. Growing public awareness of the 
extended nature of ecological degradation (due to a greater public availability of 
scientific research on pollution levels) triggers a renewal of demands for greater 
intergenerational solidarity. The temporal direction of accelerating rates of pollution 
and their cumulative negative effects on health and living conditions create 
problems of asymmetry in relations of power between generations. Yet, at present, 
no one is assigned the task of addressing such inequalities.97 This brings to the fore 
fundamental issues regarding status inequalities and unfair exclusions that youth 
coalitions, in particular, insist must be addressed immediately.98 In principle, all state 
democratic institutions are open to the possibility of institutional reform in response 
to such new justice demands. Indeed, a legal normative principle of openness is 
embedded in most democratic state constitutions (covering all aspects of decision-
making from legislative, administrative, regulatory through to their operational 
dimensions) and EU Treaties.99 Both existing political decision-making and legal 
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frameworks are, therefore, capable of accommodating new justice imperatives. The 
focus now must be on actualizing these potentials and working towards building 
more sustainable futures, addressing the uncooperative stance of governments and 
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